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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study on China’s relations with Brazil and Argentina, as
well as its implications for U.S. concerns examines two main
questions: Why China’s increasing influence on Brazil and
Argentina may be considered a cause for U.S. security
concerns? And if this is the case, how do China’s strategic
alliances with the two countries has impacted U.S.
leadership? In an effort to look at China’s influence from
multidimensional angles and beyond China’s visible
economic influence in these two countries, this paper argues
that China’s interest in the Latin American region, with a
focus on Brazil and Argentina, responds to a more crafted,
pragmatic and tailored vision with long-term strategic and
political goals.
The results of this study reveal that China ―avoiding intraregional competition through a strategic diversification of
sectors― has been able to secure critical resources for its
population as well as promote enduring alliances in the
region that could represent a plausible cause of concern for
U.S. interests. In this regard, China’s avoidance of a direct
challenge to traditional partners’ influence has responded to
the gaps left by a gradual, but steady lack of U.S.
involvement.
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INTRODUCTION
Why China’s increasing influence on Brazil and Argentina
may be considered a cause for U.S. security concerns? If so,
how do China’s strategic alliances with the two countries has
impacted U.S. leadership? This paper argues that China’s
footprint needs to be looked upon from multidimensional
angles. It also calls for the need to examine these
relationships beyond the more visible China’s economic
influence that respond to a cross-regional quest for survival
in a globalized market, with aggressive investments in
commodities, mining, infrastructure, and energy sectors.
It has been often noted that China’s influence in the region
has responded to the gaps left by a gradual but steady lack of
U.S. involvement during the last decade. Worth noting is that
Argentina and Brazil have obtained advantages in the
relationship with China. In the case of Argentina, the
relationship has been focused on the promotion of long-term
economic investments as a key commodities’ supplier while
Brazil has benefitted from a more enduring strategic alliance,
as a global oil supplier as well as from military agreements
reached with China.
Furthermore, China’s interest in Latin America, primarily on
Brazil and Argentina, responds to a more pragmatic, crafted,
and tailored vision that has political and strategic goals. This
vision, that seeks to avoid direct competitive confrontation
with the U.S., and to diversify sectors, has been oriented to
assuring less-intra region competition. Hence, targeted
investment strategies have been identified for each of the
countries involved to foster bilateral relations instead of
promoting a grand strategy of economic investments in the
region. In this way, each country negotiates directly with the
Chinese government according to the commodities,
manufacturing, or services it is best positioned to offer.
2

The paper illustrates this theoretical framework with
evidence from Brazil and Argentina, with a special focus on
the implications of China’s relationship with both countries,
as well as how they represent or not, a reason for concern for
U.S. interests. This qualitative and comparative analysis
gathers data from national agencies of the countries under
study; as well as from articles, reports, and available data in
international organizations.
THE REDESIGN OF INTERCONNECTEDNESS: U.S.
AND CHINA’S INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
Union opened new topics for discussion that continue to
puzzle analysts even today. During the last years of the
twentieth century, numerous forecasts were made regarding
the international system and the behavior of the main actors
on the global scene.
As an emerging power, the People’s Republic of China
began to perceive how the international system initiated a
transition process toward a multi-polar structure of power, in
which the main powers exerted their levels of influence
according to their respective areas of interests.
The new reality shifted completely away from what had been
deemed the norm by the end of World War II, when a strict
bipolar structure of power fostered strategic stability. Such
bipolarity has now disappeared. Today’s world is a multipolar and interconnected arena in which economic
competition has turned volatile, uncertain, and fierce.
Currently, States compete for commodities and services
available in the global market, and struggle to compete
internationally by placing their products in different markets.
At the same time, a combination of interests has steadily
increased the strategic worth of certain products considered
3

of importance from an economic, political, and defense
perspective.
When examining a country like China, and the dramatic pace
of its economic upsurge, it is impossible to overlook its
economic milestones. A recent report from the Brookings
Institution citing an International Monetary Fund report
highlights the fact that China will soon become the world’s
largest economy, making the United States the second
world’s economy.1 Of particular interest is the fact that
China was, in the mid-twentieth century, a poor country;
consequently, its economic and political development took
place in only half a century. Although Richard Bush notes in
that report that it remains unclear as to when China will
surpass the United States in terms of economic performance,
the trend indicates that this situation (as measured by the
gross domestic product) could take place in the next few
years.2
CHINA’S STRATEGY TOWARD ARGENTINA
The People’s Republic of China has shown preference for
the Asian region and for countries that share its external
interests. Yet, China’s interests have increasingly turned to
Latin American countries, which now occupy a strong
secondary place in Beijing’s areas of interest. As noted by
Mauricio Cardenas, China has shown a strategic interest in
the Latin American region at the same time that the United
States has been losing its influence.3 Cardenas highlights the
1

Richard C. Bush III, ―As Number One, China to Face Hour of Choice,‖
Brookings Institution, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, June 30
2011,
http://www.brookingstsinghua.cn/sitecore/content/Home/opinions/2011/0
630_china_bush.aspx.
2
Ibid.
3
Mauricio Cárdenas, "Think Again: Latin America," Foreign Policy,
March 17, 2011, page 2.
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fact that China is now Brazil’s and Chile’s principal trading
partner. In the last two years (2009-2010), China’s
Development Bank (CDB) signed agreements (generally
loans-for-oil agreements) to lend $35 billion to countries in
Latin America, including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Ecuador, and Venezuela.4 On the other hand, it is also worth
noting that Latin American countries, especially the larger
markets in Argentina and Brazil, continue to be of interest
for the United States. Cardenas emphasizes that despite
having only 40 percent of China’s population, the region’s
―average per capita income is twice that of China’s.‖5
Bearing this in mind, the China has been looking to a wide
array of strategies to strengthen its presence in the region by
pursuing economic, political, and cultural approaches.
Latin America’s relationships with China have stemmed
from a new world of interconnectedness and a strategy
designed to diversify their leverage in world affairs.6 Under
Mao Tse-Tung, China followed a policy of international
isolation – especially in the political realm-, with the
assumption that China did not fall under ―the norms and
regulations of the international relations that defined
occidental powers.‖7 Subsequent reforms by Deng Xiaoping
followed, with an open policy carried out by Jiang Zemin
and the current government of Hu Jintao.8 This evolution
toward the opening to global markets has significantly
impacted China’s economic development as well as
4

Cárdenas, ―Think Again,‖ 2.
Ibid.
6
David Shambaugh, ―China’s New Foray into Latin America,‖
Brookings Institution, November 17, 2008,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/1117_china_shambaugh.aspx
(Accessed on July 3, 2011).
7
Fisac, Taciana, and Steve Tsang.
. (Santiago: Ediciones Bellaterra, 2000),
416.
8
Ibid, 415
5
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contributed to soundly positioning the country as a global
emerging power.
China’s approaches often take advantage of the loopholes
left by the United States in Latin America—especially
during recent years, when international threats in other
regions have captivated most of the United States’ attention
in regard to defense of its national interests. For example, in
the case of the Argentine government, the governments of
both President Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) and his
successor, wife, and widow Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner
(2007-2011) made an ideological turn to the ―new left‖ that
guided not only national but also foreign policy as well as
how strategic alliances are identified, strengthened, or
dismissed in the international system. As a result, China
found itself, with a friendly political-ideological scenario.
Thus, from the Chinese foreign policy’s viewpoint, the ―antiAmerican spirit‖ of the Argentine government (revived from
the Peronists’ nationalism of the 1970s and the Montoneros’
guerrilla ideology) has, over the last decades, shaped public
opinion with a favorable environment for the containment of
a worldwide hegemonic policy of the United States, to China
is opposed as a basic principle of its foreign policy. 9
Since 2003, the Kirchners’ government—in clear opposition
to previous Argentinean governments that were aligned with
the United States, has shown that ideology prevails in the
process of decision making. Indeed, President Fernandez has
been extremely critical of the United States’ economic
policy, and has emphasized her country’s ability to withstand
the economic whirlwind initiated in the United States in
2008. Hence, to a great extent, the political space that China
finds in Argentina is the result of the policies and ideological
stance of the last two Argentine administrations (Justicialista
9

Sheng Hu, Breve Historia del Partido Comunista de China, (Beijing:
Ediciones en Lenguas Extranjeras, 1994).
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Party) and to a lesser extent, the limited credit that the
United States grants Argentina in regard to its relative
influence in the American sub-continent.
In the case of China, it has reached consistency between its
internal economic reform processes, the opening up of the
Chinese government, which has defined a set of geographical
and strategic priorities that include the access to
commodities and energetic resources, as well as relations
with Taiwan. In this context, China’s relations with
Argentina are oriented to further develop some of the
mentioned objectives. In the political realm, China aims to
consolidate its position of ―One China‖ and that of Taiwan
as an inalienable part of the Asian country. In this regard,
Argentina has opposed Taiwan’s attempts to gain admission
in international organizations such as the United Nations, the
Organization of American States and the World Health
Organization, all forums in which Argentina has adopted an
active and unequivocal position in support of the principle of
―One China.‖
In addition, the Argentine government recognizes Tibet as
having been integrated into the territory of the People’s
Republic of China. In turn, Argentina has obtained China’s
support for its claim on sovereignty of the Falkland Islands’
(Islas Malvinas) and in its quest for a permanent membership
at the UN Security Council. Furthermore, Argentina has
consistently opted for abstaining on votes dealing with
China’s human rights situations. China’s strengthened
relations with Argentina and Brazil, as founding members of
MERCOSUR, further serve the needs of the Chinese
government to pressure other countries in the region political
and economically, including Paraguay, who is the only
member of the economic bloc that maintains diplomatic
relations with Taiwan.
7

Regarding defense and military policy, the opening of the
Argentine military market to Chinese products is still
inchoate, primarily due to the fact that Argentina’s armed
forces remain the privileged historical benefactor of
armaments from Europe and the United States. Also, both
Kirchner administrations have promoted the development of
a national defense industry. 10 Yet some rapprochements and
discussion between national officials related to logistics have
promoted the advancement of military agreements between
Beijing and Buenos Aires, including Argentina’s testing of
certain Chinese vehicles (trucks for civil and military use)
and dual-use helicopters.11 Other types of exchanges have
included visits of high-ranking military officers and
provision of training courses aimed at fostering ties and
cooperation between the two military.
Argentina’s military relations with China were strengthened
by the visit of then-Minister of Defense Nilda Garre to China
in 2007. Following the visit, the two countries signed the
first military cooperation agreement of cooperation in the
area of defense. This visit was particularly noteworthy in that
several previous invitations extended to Argentina’s Minister
of Defense had been postponed for various reasons. The
document signed Beijing in 2007 set the stage for ―carry[ing]
out contacts in communications, personnel visits in all areas,

10

The Kirchner couple have attempted to engage in a ―limited‖ process
of import substitution industrialization in this sector, as a way to counter
the country’s dependence to foreign imports by focusing on not only the
exports of commodities, but also the creation of heavy manufacturing to
supply the country’s needs.
11
Ministerio de Defensa de la Republica Argentina, ―Argentina y China
firmaron acuerdo de cooperación militar,‖ 5/16/2007, Información de
Prensa Nº 116/07,
http://www.mindef.gov.ar/info.asp?Id=393&bus=1&comboN=titulo&crit
erioN=china&vDiaN=&vMesN=&vAnioN= (Accessed on July 27, 2011)
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exchange of logistics and military equipment, and training of
personnel for peace-keeping operations.‖12
In sheer commercial terms, Roberto Russell notes in a
Foreign Affairs article that the rise of Asia, including China
and India, at the end of the nineteenth and in the early
twentieth century, offered Argentina a good possibility to
move away from a decade of isolation from international
markets and resume a significant role in international
markets.13 Yet, the fact that Argentina is still struggling to
become a solid international player after the much publicized
2001 economic crisis, embarking on cooperative relations
with non-U.S.-friendly partners such as Venezuela’s Hugo
Chavez and continuously attempting to move further from
U.S. influence (thus sustaining a non-depreciable antiAmerican sentiment), sets the stage for a wait-and-see
scenario in U.S.-Argentine relations. In this regard, Russell
underscores how Argentina is viewed by Washington with a
sentiment of distrust and ambiguity, with an uncertain
political and economic model.14 Meanwhile, recent SinoArgentine relations constructed primarily upon mutual
economic needs (e.g., the provision of commodities by
Argentina and prominent economic investments by China)
could subsequently serve to ensure a broader international
role for Argentina.

12

Ministerio de Defensa de la República Argentina,
http://www.mindef.gov.ar/comunicacion_gacetillas.asp?eje=30&page=5
&bus=3&comboN=&criterioN=&vDiaN=&vMesN=&vAnioN=,
(Accessed on July 9, 2011).
13
Roberto Russell, ―La relaciones Argentina-Estados Unidos,‖ Foreign
Affairs Latinoamérica, 8.4 (2008): 92-98,
http://fal.itam.mx/descargas/fal_octubre_2008/15_Roberto_Russell.pdf
(Accessed on July 11, 2011)
14
Ibid
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CHINA AND BRAZIL: PERSPECTIVES
ENDURING STRATEGIC ALLIANCE

OF

AN

In a comparative regional assessment, the relationship
between Brazil and China has a completely different
dimension from that of Argentina and China. The fact that
Brazil has emerged during the last decade as a hemispheric
power and is now considered the eight economy of the
world, exerting influence not only in the Americas, but also
at the global level, has put the Sino-Brazilian relationship at
a different level. Brazil has strengthened economic ties with
China through full-fledged trade on several commodities, as
well as on manufactured products and technology.
Brazil’s behavior in the region has often been considered
―different‖ by its neighbors in Latin America. The country
has largely sought different markets to expand its economy,
often turning it back on its counterparts in the region while
preferring to deal with other regions, such as Asia and
Europe. Itamaraty15 has often displayed its diplomacy
independently from the Latin American bloc, thus provoking
distrust within the region. Its Latin American neighbors have
often found that Brazil’s attitude does not contribute to
regional efforts to advance common economic goals as a
bloc.16
In recent years, both under President Luiz Ignacio ―Lula‖ da
Silva, and more recently, the administration of Dilma
Rousseff, Brazil has broadened its military agreements with
15

Itamaraty is the name given to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry.
See Roberto Russell and Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, ―Percepciones
Argentinas de Brasil: Ambivalencias y Expectativas,‖ Plataforma
Democrática, Working Paper N 19, July 2011, 8,
http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Arquivos/Plataforma_Democratic
a_Working_Paper_19_2011_Espanhol.pdf (Accessed on September 5,
2011)
16
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China.17 As a result of diverse cooperative agreements,
Brazil has been very appealing for Chinese objectives in the
region, fostering the opening of a plausible enduring,
cooperative, and strategic alliance with an emerging power
to secure its internal needs as well as compete in the global
market, principles that constitute a cornerstone of its foreign
policy. With 190 million inhabitants, Brazil is the most
resource-rich country of Latin America and has steadily
consolidated its influence over the rest of the countries at the
regional level over the last few years—to the point that the
country can be arguably defined as a ―primus inter pares.‖18
China’s political and military presence in Brazil has been
continuously growing, and its leverage and presence in
Brazil are more notable than in the case of neighboring
Argentina. David Shambaugh, at the Brookings Institute,
notes that China provides military training to Latin American
officers and sells military arms to countries in the region,
including ―helicopters, artillery, anti-air and anti-ship
missiles and light assault weapons, while buying anti-tank,
anti-air missiles and avionics from Brazil.‖ 19
The Brazilian model has developed steadily as a result of the
economic reforms of the 1990s, the consolidation of
democratic institutions, and effective public policies in
17

Government of Brazil, ―Agreements between the Government of the
Federative Republic of Brazil and the Government of the People’s
Republic of China,‖ Portal Brasil, 04/12/2011,
http://www.brasil.gov.br/news/history/2011/04-1/12/agreementsbetween-the-government-of-the-federative-republic-of-brazil-and-thegovernment-of-the-people2019s-republic-of-china (Accessed on August,
3, 2011)
18
The Oxford Dictionaries defines primus inter pares as ―a first among
equals,‖ Oxford Dictionaries,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/primus+inter+pares?region=us
(Accessed on July 4, 2011)
19
Shambaugh, ―China’s New Foray,‖ page 1.
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national and foreign policy. 20 Ricardo Sennes notes in a 2008
article that Brazil’s economic stability, the reassurance of the
credit and capital markets, and improved economic growth
has played a role in the ―internationalization of the economy
of Brazil.‖21
When analyzing the political dimensions of China’s
relationship with Brazil and implications for the United
States, it is important not to overlook the differences that
exist between Brazil and China in terms of their domestic
institutions. Brazilian experts Carlos Pereira and Augusto de
Castro Neves recently noted in their Brookings Institution’s
policy paper that contrasts between both emerging powers
are highly visible: whereas Brazil is a democratic market
economy, China is a ―predominantly planned economy ruled
by an authoritarian regime.‖22 From a geopolitical point of
view of south-south relations, Brazil and China have more
coincidences than disagreements in cross-regional and
international issues, which are reflected and strengthened in
international forums such as the G-20 meeting and the
international summits of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa). However, despite such
international attempts for cooperation, national interests still
prevail in the strategic pursuits of both countries.
Sennes underscores from an economic perspective that
Brazil’s relations with non-traditional partners (such as
China and some African countries) as well as traditional ones
20

Ricardo Sennes, ―Las relaciones Brasil-Estados Unidos: Un Acuerdo
Tácito,‖ Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, 2008,
http://fal.itam.mx/descargas/fal_octubre_2008/14_Ricardo_Sennes.pdf
(Accessed on July 13, 2011).
21
Sennes, ―Las relaciones,‖ p. 1.
22
Carlos Pereira and Joao Augusto de Castro Neves, ―Brazil and China;
South-South Partnership or North-South Competition?‖ Policy Paper
No. 26, March 2011, Foreign Policy at Brookings, Washington, DC.,
page 2.
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(regional partners and European countries) have influenced
the reduction of relative leverage of the United States over
the last decade.23 Yet, the United States continues to be a
relevant commercial partner of Brazil, especially in regards
to services, innovation, and energy sectors.24
Finally, the evidence of the growing commitments between
both countries confirm the assumption that China has cast its
eyes on Brazil in the quest for an enduring strategic alliance,
understanding that Brazil is a prosperous country with a
technologically driven process of modernization that drives it
to play the role of a key actor with a major influence in both
the international and regional scenes.
CONCLUSIONS: CHINA’S INVOLVEMENT AND U.S.
SECURITY CONCERNS
This paper has sought to examine China’s growing interest in
Latin America, with a special focus on Argentina and Brazil.
As it has been noted, China’s involvement in the region has
been carefully tailored to the specific needs of each of the
two countries under study, basically encountering clear
asymmetries in the kinds of alliances currently being drawn
in the region. China has aggressively invested in both
countries. Its relations with Argentina seem to be more
economically driven, with the former securing a long-term
provision of commodities for its growing population.
On the other hand, China’s relationship with Brazil has many
edges that need to be examined from a multidimensional
perspective, as many areas have and are being developed,
especially in the commodities, oil, technological, and
military sectors. Nevertheless, an important question
remains: Does China’s involvement represent a growing
23
24

Sennes, ―Las relaciones,‖ page 2.
Ibid, 7
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security concern for the United States? At this point, it looks
like China’s steady involvement in the region is definitely a
cause for concern for the United States. China has opened
the space in the region, effectively taking advantages of
those left open by the United States. Until the United States
resumes a larger role in the region—if it ever does—
developments will remain unclear.
Furthermore, a stubborn economic crisis, an uncertain global
market, and military challenges overseas have been key
factors that have pushed the United States to temporarily
abandon its interests in the region, especially in Brazil and
Argentina. In turn, these two countries have attempted to
initiate and secure relations with other non-traditional
partners, especially China. However, recent caveats on Latin
American countries’ dependence on the Chinese economy
could be severely affected by a slowdown of the Chinese
economy, severely impacting Brazil’s and Argentina’s
commodities’ sector.25
China’s initial footprint in these two countries has been
widely considered economically driven. Yet the evidence
suggests that this involvement responds to a much more
crafted political and strategic vision, especially in the case of
Brazil. Indeed, China has been extremely careful in avoiding
intra-regional conflict by diversifying its areas of interests, as
25

Pereira and Castro Neves noted how China’s involvement strategy in
Brazil, is causing some reason for concern on security issues. Restrictive
measures carried out by Brazilian ministries are being designed to control
Chinese investments in land purchases. As the authors highlight, these
acquisitions (by China’s state-owned enterprises) are thought to have
possible negative impacts on security issues as well as land sovereignty
and commodity prices. Some critics have also argued that China is taking
advantage of Brazilian military technology, as evident in the recent
decision to close Brazilian Embraer’s plant in China and embark on the
construction of Brazilian-like aircrafts. See Pereira and Castro Neves,
―Brazil and China,‖ page 6.
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evident in the cases of Argentina and Brazil. In addition, it
has largely avoided directly challenging American influence
in the region. In this sense, China has moved away from
engaging in security issues, such as the control of terrorism,
drug wars, and the rise of civil guerrillas, especially in
Central American countries and Mexico.
Finally, American security concerns regarding Chinese
involvement with Brazil and Argentina should not to be
overlooked. Brazil has consolidated its democratic
institutions over the last decade and pursued a market
democracy, and Itamaraty has been an active and sometimes
unpredictable player in global diplomacy, with critical
leverage in international forums that may challenge
American security concerns—especially regarding relations
with countries that maintain a tense relation with
Washington. In this sense, a more solid cross-regional
strategic alliance with China could be perceived as
potentially harmful for American security interests in the
global system. In the case of Argentina, these possibilities
are much more limited, but also warrant further attention.

15
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